NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Hastings Ismay famously remarked that the “core mission of the NATO alliance was to keep the Germans down, the Russians out, and the Americans in.” This memorable observation at the time of NATO's creation in 1949 reflected widespread fears in Western Europe of the potential dangers of German revanchism, Russian expansionism, and American isolationism.
The common belief among European statesmen that Woodrow Wilson's failure to persuade his country to join the League of Nations following World War I substantially contributed to the advent of World War II, powerfully shaped the post-1945 consensus that only an American-led military alliance could deter the looming menace of Soviet communism that had already engulfed Eastern Europe.
In the 42 years between its creation and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO not only fulfilled Lord Ismay's prescription but in doing so became the most successful and enduring military alliance in history.
Strategically the success of the alliance rested on the doctrine of “ containment,” first enunciated by America's renowned diplomat George Kennan. This concept defined NATO as a purely defensive alliance which would guarantee the territorial integrity of all member states ( under the treaty’s Article 5) but would not undertake offensive military action violating the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union or its Warsaw Pact allies.
The resulting standoff between the world's two great nuclear powers, variously described by the terms “Cold War,” or “detente “ or “peaceful coexistence," gave Europe—despite periodic crises—its longest period of peace in the 20th century.
With the fortuitous ending of the Cold War—NATO's crowning achievement—there followed a period of euphoria over-optimistically described by historian Francis Fukuyama as the “End of History.” Amidst that heady atmosphere there arose the question of NATO's future. Was there a new mission, and what would it look like?
A third of a century later, the failure to satisfactorily answer these questions has led directly to NATO's current crisis revolving around the Ukraine war. Today NATO remains an anti-Russian alliance, but with the critical difference of having greatly expanded its memberships right up to the borders of Russia—a development stridently opposed by Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Angela Merkel, and other credible observers who viewed it as a dangerous and destabilizing provocation.
These warnings proved prophetic when NATO announced its decision to place Ukraine on a path to membership despite repeated Russian assertions that said action crossed a “red line” for the Kremlin. In consequence Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, and the NATO alliance in turn made a massive commitment to wage a “proxy war” against Russia involving billions of dollars, vast amounts of weapons and ammunition, technical and intelligence support, and sweeping economic sanctions against Russia.
In taking this action on behalf of a nation that was neither a member nor an ally of any member, NATO decisively went beyond its historic and successful role as a purely defensive alliance. Now after three years of the most devastating and brutal combat seen on the European continent since World War II, nearly a million Russian and Ukrainian soldiers are dead, and the ripples from the stalemated war have dramatically transformed the geopolitical structure of the world.
At present the NATO alliance is in the grip of the most severe internal crisis in its 75-year history. Following three years of immensely costly warfare led by a feckless U.S. administration with no exit strategy or clear goals beyond cliches like “in it to win it” or “as long as it takes,” the world of NATO has been turned upside down by a decisive American presidential election which has replaced that discredited Administration with a new government strongly determined to stop the killing in Ukraine and cease support for those “forever wars” that have so debilitated the United States over the last quarter of a century.
As American allies from Vietnam to Afghanistan have learned to their sorrow, open-ended pledges of support such as “in to win it” or “as long as it takes” are subject to sudden cancellation if the American people become disillusioned with a distant war never adequately explained or intelligently pursued. In truth the American people over time have been remarkably patient and accepting of great sacrifice in support of long wars of dubious merit, but there are limits to their patience.
Now the future of NATO will depend on how honestly its leaders can acknowledge the errors of recent years, reconcile differing national viewpoints, and redefine a sense of common purpose that their peoples will be willing to trust.
William Moloney studied history and politics at Oxford and the University of London and received his Doctorate from Harvard University. His articles have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, The Hill, Washington Post, Washington Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Baltimore Sun, Denver Post and Human Events.